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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH'V. McKAY and
BETTY McKAY, husband
and wife,

:

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 14149

SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation,

:

Defendant-Respondent. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a property damage action arising out of
road construction work undertaken on public domain adjacent
to the plaintiffs1 residential property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Stewart M- Hanson, Jr., presiding, granted summary judgment
in favor of respondent Salt Lake City, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants have failed to accurately state the
undisputed material facts and a restatement of the facts is
therefore necessary.

The parties will hereinafter be

designated as they appeared in the trial court.
Plaintiffs are owners of residential property
located at 1334 East 1st South Street near the University of
Utah campus in Salt Lake City, Utah.

[R. 1]

In August,

1972, Salt Lake City began a remodeling project to widen
First South Street to accomodate the heavy traffic flow on
this primary access route to the University campus.

[R. 43]

In order to do so, the City removed landfill, landscaping
and other improvements, all of which were located on City
property adjacent to the plaintiffs1 property.

[R. 43-44]

As a result of the construction work and the
alteration of the grade of First South, the plaintiffs claim
they were damaged because landscaping adjacent to their
property was removed, access to their home was impaired and
the City workers negligently damaged and trespassed upon
their property during the course of the work.

[R. 1-3]

In order to seek redress of their grievances, the
plaintiffs met with City Streets Commissioner Stephen Harmsen
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on October 13, 1972, while the construction work was still
proceeding.

[R. 45]

They informed him of their complaints

and, in particular,, suggested that the City construct a
decorative retaining wall adjacent to their property in place
of the proposed wall planned by city engineers.

[R. 44]

The

plaintiffs also wanted to construct, at their expense, a new
stairway which would encroach upon City property.

According

to the plaintiffs, Commissioner Harmsen expressed concern
and his belief that the City might be able to accomodate their
wishes.

[R. 45]
Since the decorative wall and stairway requested

by the plaintiffs were to be constructed on city property,
Commissioner Harmsen advised them to submit architectural
drawings for consideration by the City commission and the City
Engineer.

[R. 45]

The plaintiffs did so and, although the

City refused to pay for a brick facing on the wall, Commissioner
Harmsen informed the plaintiffs that their wall would be
built and, subject to acquiring insurance, they could build
the stairway which would encroach upon City property.

[R. 45]

On February 22, 1973, as the street remodeling project
was nearly completed, the City began construction of the
retaining wall adjacent to the city's sidewalk as it had
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been originally designed by the City engineer,

[R. 45]

When

they discovered this fact, the plaintiffs halted the work and
immediately contacted commissioner Harmsen to complain about
the City's obvious change of heart.

[R. 45-46]

Commissioner

Harmsen investigated the matter and on February 23, 1973, he
informed the plaintiffs of the city's position*

[R. 46]

According to the plaintiffs, Harmsen advised them
that the City had decided to complete the street project as
originally designed with a cement retaining wall adjacent to
the city sidewalk, rather than adjacent to the plaintiffs1
property..

[R. 46]

However, if the plaintiffs wished, the

City was willing to pay them $2,400.00 and the plaintiffs
could build a decorative wall of their choice next to the
sidewalk, provided it conformed to the City's specifications.
[R. 46]

The plaintiffs were also advised that they could build

their stairway/ but no other offers were extended, inferred
or contemplated.
The road construction project originally causing
the plaintiffs' complaints was completed in March, 1973.
[R. 44]
After receiving the City's final offer on February 23,
1973, the plaintiffs took no action to assert their claim for
over five months until August, 1973, when they contacted an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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attorney,

[R. 46-47]

A written notice of claim was finally

filed on September 28, 1973, over seven, months after Commissioner
Harmsen had advised the plaintiffs of the City's final offer.
[R. 47]
Whatever the effect negotiations may have had on
the plaintiffs' claim, if any existed, prior to February, 1973,
the trial court held that there were no facts reasonably
indicating that the City induced or encouraged the plaintiffs
to delay prosecuting their claim after February 23, 1973.
Since the plaintiffs failed to file a timely notice of claim
after that date, the court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendant, no cause of action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

(R. 58-60]
•

THE PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS FOR DEPRECIATION

OF PROPERTY VALUE ARE BARRED BY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.
The lav; in Utah is irrefutably established that
governmental entities are immune to suit for damages caused
in the performance of governmental functions, unless immunity
is expressly waived by the legislature.

Governmental

immunity has not been waived for plaintiffs' claims for
depreciation of the value of their property caused by the
alteration of public property adjacent to their home.
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In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that the
value of their property has been depreciated as a consequence
of the remodeling of First South Street.

In particular, the

plaintiffs claim loss of adjacent lateral support and impairment of access due to alteration of the grade and width of
the street.

In short, the appearance and accessibility of

their home was damaged by removal of landscaped City property.
With the adoption of the comprehensive Utah Governmental Immunity Act in 1965, the legislature prescribed the
exclusive means by which claims may be asserted against
governmental entities for damages caused in the performance
of governmental functions.

Utah code Ann. §63-30-3 (Repl,

Vol. 1968) states:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
act, all governmental entities shall be immune
from suit for all injury which may result from
the activities of said entities wherein said
entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge
of a governmental function.
(Emphasis added)
in Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941),
the Court long ago determined that road construction work of
the kind performed in this case is governmental, rather than
proprietary, in nature.

Thus, plaintiffs are entitled to

recover damages only if the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
so provides.

It does not.
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In Holt v, Utah State Road Commission, 3 0 Utah 2d 4,
511'P.2d 1286 (1973), this Court applied the Governmental
Immunity Act in a situation virtually identical to the instant
case and held the defendant immune.

In Holt, the owners of

property on the corner of an intersection sought damages
caused by the construction of an underpass which lowered the
grade of the street and impaired access to the plaintiff's
property.

Citing Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3, the Court observed:
This seems to indicate an intention that the
act be strictly applied to preserve sovereign
immunity; and to waive it only as clearly expressed
therein. 511 P.2d at 1288.

Turning to the only conceivable provision of the Act that
could arguably permit a suit for depreciation of property
value as a result of impaired access to property, the Court
held: ,:.
It is our opinion that reading Section 6
in the light of that rule, the waiver of
immunity from suit ,ffor the recovery of any
property real or personal or for the possession
thereof" cannot be construed to include an
action of this character to recover damages
for inconvenience of access to property....Id.
In view of the unequivocal language of Utah Code
Ann. §63-30-3 and the clear intent of the legislature in
consolidating the law of governmental immunity into one act,
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the plaintiffs in the instant case are not entitled to a
recovery of damages.

No constitutional provision requires

compensation to landowners whose access to and value of
property are adversely affected by road construction work.
As the Court stated in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County,
10 Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (I960), in a case where landowners sought damages for depreciation of the value of their
property caused by road construction work:
As to [damages for depreciation in preventing
access], consistently and historically we have
ruled that the State may not be sued without
its consent; taken the view that Art. I, Sec.
22 of our Constitution is not self-executing,
nor does it give consent to be sued, implied
or otherwise; and that to secure such consent
is a legislative matter.... 354 P.2d at 105.
It is also clear that Commissioner Harmsen's
representations cannot waive governmental immunity preserved
by the Act for the damages allegedly caused by loss of adjacent
lateral support and convenience of access to the plaintiffs1
property.

In the very recent case of Bailey Service and

Supply Corp. v. State Road Commission, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah,
1975), the trial court awarded damages for depreciation of
property caused by loss of access when the State Road Commission
allegedly stipulated to a waiver of governmental immunity. Rever
the Court held that only the legislature can waive sovereign
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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immunity and the Road Commission's attempt to do so was
without legal effect.

The Court concluded:

Prior decisions of this court have established
the principle that there can be no recovery
from the State for damages where the construction
of the highway or the erection of structures
within the public right-of-way impair or
adversely affect the convenience of access to
the property of an abutting owner.
533 P.2d at 883.
In support of their claim for recovery of damage
caused by loss of convenient access to their property,
plaintiffs rely solely upon the case of Hampton v. State
Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968).

In

Hampton, the Court held that governmental immunity for such
damage had been waived by Utah Code Ann. §73-11-9 (1953).
The plaintiffs neglected to add, however, that Utah Code
Ann. §78-11-9 was repealed in 1971 and that the subsequent
decisions of this Court have extinguished whatever vitality
the Hampton decision once had.
In summary, the plaintiffs' claims for depreciation
of the value of their property are barred by sovereign
immunity.

It is not disputed that the changes in the grade

and width of First South Street were made in the public
interest.

In order to accomplish this project, it was
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necessary to remove landscaped city property and improvements
adjacent to the plaintiffs' property and to thereby alter
lateral support and convenience of

access.

In recognition

of public necessity, however, the legislature has retained
the governmental immunity which bars the plaintiffs' claim
for consequential damages.
Consequently, the Court should affirm the judgment
of the court below.
POINT II.

THE PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS ARE BARRED

BY THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT,
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Salt Lake
City negligently removed lateral support of the plaintiffs'
property and negligently damaged landscaping and improvements
in the course of the road construction project.

The trial

court correctly held that these claims as well as those
previously discussed are barred because the plaintiffs failed
to file a notice of claim within the time prescribed by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
A prerequisite to maintaining an action for damages
against a political subdivision of the State of Utah is
compliance with the statutory notice requirements set forth
in the Governmental Immunity Act.

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13
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(Repl. Vol. 1968) provides,
in may
its
relevant
part:

A claim against a political subdivision shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof is
filed within 90 days after the cause of
action arises...,
A "political subdivision" is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-2 to mean any city.
In a long line of cases this Court has consistently
and resolutely adhered to its conviction that strict compliance
with the notice provisions is a prerequisite to maintaining
any action against a governmental entity.

As stated in

Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972):
Inasmuch as the maintenance of such a cause
of action derives from such statutory authority,
a prerequisite thereto is meeting the conditions
prescribed in this statute. A party seeking to
obtain the benefit thereof should not be entitled
to claim the favorable aspects which confer the
rights, and disavow the conditions upon which
the rights are predicated. 492 P.2d at 1337.
In the instant case, the plaintiffs filed a written
notice of claim on September 25, 1973, nearly one year after
meeting with Commissioner Harmsen in October, 1972, to complain
about their damages.

Their notice of claim states that all

damages were incurred during 1972 and no basis for the delay
in presenting their claim was stated therein.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In response to Salt Lake City's motion for judgment
on the pleadings, plaintiffs alleged that commissioner Harmsen
induced them to delay filing their claim.

Plaintiffs now cite

this court's decision in Rice v. Granite School District,
23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969) in support of their contention.
In the instant case, however, the trial court correctly held
that the Rice decision is wholly distinguishable from the facts
of this lawsuit and that a different result is warranted.
In Rice, the plaintiff submitted a formal claim to
the school district and, thereafter, was contacted by an
insurance adjuster who had statutory authority to accept or
deny claims against the governmental entity.

The adjuster

reassured the plaintiff that the school district admitted all
responsibility for her injuries and would pay all expenses
as soon as they had been determined.

Although she attempted

to settle the claim on several occasions, the plaintiff was
told that a settlement could not be made until she had been
released by her treating physician.

While the plaintiff

patiently waited for a release from her physician, the
statutory period for filing a lawsuit elapsed and the plaintiff's
claim was denied.

The Court correctly held that the delay in
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prosecuting the plaintiff's claim was unfairly induced by the
adjuster and that the school district was equitably estopped
from alleging the limitations defense.
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from
Rice for several reasons.

First, Commissioner Harmsen had no

statutory authority to authorize a compromise of the plaintiffs1
claim and, therefore, the City could not be estopped by his
actions.

In Rice, the Court emphasized the importance of the

status of the insurance carrier under the Governmental
Immunity Act and stated:
The insurance carrier is specifically authorized
to approve or deny a claim; therefore, we are
not confronted by a fact situation wherein the
agent's act ions we re no u autho.rized by statute
and the gov ernment.al en 4_L 1-J L4~ 7 could not be
estopped to assert the sta tute of. 1;Imitations.
456 P.2d at 161 (Emphasis added)
Since the Governmental Immunity Act vests authority to settle
claims only in the governmental entity, in this case the Board
of City Commissioners, or its insurance carrier, Commissioner
Harmsen was acting without authority and his individual actions
cannot constitute an estoppel against the City/
Second, in Rice, the plaintiff was instructed to
delay taking action until her damages could be ascertained
at which time, she was told, a settlement offer would be made/
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In the instant case, however, the Cicy did not request or
require inaction by the plaintiffs.

To the contrary, on

February 23, 1973, the City made its final offer and the

r

plaintiffs had an opportunity to either accept it or to
prosecute their claims according to the statute.

Their

inaction for nearly seven months thereafter is clearly not
attributable to any action or inducement by the City,
Finally, it is well established that the doctrine
of equitable estoppel cannot be invoked unless the plaintiff
exercises due diligence in commencing the appropriate legal
proceeding after the circumstances giving rise to estoppel
have ceased to be operational.

See, Annotation/ Plaintiff's

Diligence as Affecting his Right to have Defendant Estopped
from Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 44 A.L.JR. 3d 760
(1972).

In the instant case, the plaintiffs were notified

on February 23, 1973, that the City refused to grant their
request for a decorative wall and, instead, intended to proceed
to a completion of the road project as it had originally been
designed.

No other promises or representations were made.

Whatever effect prior negotiations may have had on the
limitations period, from that day forward the plaintiffs were
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required to exercise due diligence in commencing the
appropriate legal proceedings*

Their failure to take

action within 90 days cannot be attributable to any deception,
inducement, promises or misrepresentation by the City.
Consequently, the claims alleged in plaintiffs'
complaint are forever barred and the plaintiffs are not
entitled to a recovery*
As the Court stated in State v. Tanner, 30 Utah 2d
19, 512 P.2d 1022 (1973), where land owners claimed tortious
interference with water rights caused by construction of a
highway:
The claim for compensation for this waste water
being one sounding ex maleficio...defendants,
if they had any claim at all, should have .
pursued an action under the Utah act having to
do with waiver of immunity, which vas not done,
and which should resolve this case into a
remand with instructions to vacate the judgment
relating to this waste water. 512 P.2d at 1023.
(Emphasis added)
Since the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that
plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Court should affirm the
judgment of the court below.
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POINT III:

THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR TRESPASS

AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
In their second cause of action, the plaintiffs
sought recovery of special and exemplary damages caused
by the trespass of Salt Lake City employees upon their
property during the construction project.

The Utah Govern-

mental Immunity Act expressly bars recovery of damages caused
by trespass and expressly bars recovery of punitive or
exemplary damages.
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10 (Repl. Vol. 1968) waives
governmental immunity for injury caused by negligent acts of
governmental employees, but expressly reserves immunity when
injury is caused by "intentional trespass."

While plaintiffs

characterize the alleged entry of Salt Lake City workmen upon
their land during the construction activities as merely
"trespass," the trial court correctly held that such conduct
must have been "intentional" within the meaning of the statute
and plaintiffs' claim for relief is therefore barred.

The

legislature clearly intended to retain governmental immunity
when City employees enter upon the property of others to
perform governmental functions.
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The Governmental Immunity Act also prohibits any
recovery for exemplary or punitive damages,

Utah Code Ann,

§63-30-22 (Repl. Vol. 1968) states:
No judgment shall be rendered against the
governmental entity for exemplary or punitive
damages.
Consequently, the trial court correctly granted
judgment against plaintiffs, no cause of action, on their
claim for general and punitive damages based upon trespass.
POINT IV:

THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENTAL

IMMUNITY AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH
. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT APPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
Plaintiffs assert that the long standing principles
of lav; barring their recovery in this case deny their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection.

Citing

cases from the small minority of states where courts have
abolished sovereign immunity on constitutional grounds or
"in the interest of justice," they now ask the Court to
judicially legislate a new system of law.

The court should

refuse to do so.
In Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417,
354 P.2d 105 (I960), the Court considered the constitutional!
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of sovereign immunity in a case virtually identical to this
action.

The Court correctly held that the United States and

Utah constitutions are not abridged by this well established
and long standing phase of our law.
in

Quoting Justice Brandeis

Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed.

1434 (1934), the Court stated:
11

[Cjonsent to sue the United States is a
privilege accorded, not the grant of a
• property right protected bv the Fifth
Amendment. . . .The sovereign's immunity from
suit exists whatever the character of the
proceeding or source of the right sought to
be enforced. It applies alike to causes
of action arising under acts of Congress...
and to those arising from some violation of
rights conferred upon the citizen by the
Constitution....For immunity from suit is
an attribute of sovereignty which may not
be bartered away. " 354 P.2d at 106-107.
(Emphasis in original)
The Court also held that no provision of the Utah constitution
permits an action against a sovereign state nor does sovereign
immunity violate any constitutional provision.
Since governmental immunity does not offend any
constitutional right, the Court has wisely reserved to the
people the choice of how and to what extent immunity shall be
waived.

In Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986

(1961), the Court reaffirmed the validity of sovereign immunity
and stated:
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.'"-•' "

All of the members of this court, at one time
or another have expressed the elementary
principle that in cases of similar import we
must not judicially legislate, but must, in
our tri-partite form of government leave to
the legislature whether there should be a waiver
of immunity where one of the state's agencies is
functioning in a governmental capacity, such as
repairing streets.... 366 P.2d at 988-989.
(Emphasis added)
Governmental immunity is a well established and

vital phase of our law.

If it is to be changed, the change

must come through the sovereign power of the state, the people,
speaking through the legislature.
CONCLUSION

•

The principles of law governing the outcome of this
suit have been frequently litigated and are now well established.
Abutting land owners are not entitled to recover damage for
the depreciation of their property occasioned by road construction
work: adjacent to their property.

Removal of landscaped city

property and city developments which enhanced the value of and
access to the plaintiffs* home was necessary to accomodate the
public's need.

The legislature has determined that no recovery

for the consequential private loss is allowed*
In addition, the plaintiffs' claims for damage to
their property inflicted during the construction project as
well as loss of value to the property were lost because they
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failed to diligently pursue whatever rights they may have
had.

Without inducement, fraud or coercion by the City,

the plaintiffs deliberated too long before deciding to
reject the city's offer and to prosecute this claim.
Accordingly, since there are no disputed issues of
fact, the trial court correctly interpreted the well established
law of this state and granted summary judgment against the
plaintiffs, no cause of action.

That judgment should be

affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Elliott J. Williams
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor, Continental Bank: Bldg,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Ray L. Montgomery
Assistant City Attorney
101 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
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